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Background: This study reports the development and revision of the Beliefs about Paranoia
Scale (BaPS), a self-report measure to assess metacognitive beliefs about paranoia in non-
patients. We aimed to confirm the factor structure of a revised 50-item version of the measure
and test the specific hypotheses that positive beliefs about paranoia would predict frequency
of paranoia, and that negative beliefs about paranoia would predict distress associated
with paranoia. Method: 185 non-patient participants completed questionnaires assessing
beliefs about paranoia, thought control, self-consciousness, anxiety, depression and paranoia.
Results: The results showed that the original four-factor solution could not be replicated.
Instead a three-factor solution comprising Negative Beliefs about Paranoia, Paranoia as a
Survival Strategy, and Normalizing Beliefs was developed. The revised 18-item measure
showed good internal consistency. Stepwise regression analysis showed that, BaPS-negative
beliefs accounted for 34% of the variance with R2 of 0.339, with a multiple R of 0.585
in relation to frequency of paranoia. In relation to distress arising from paranoia, stepwise
regression analysis showed that BaPS-negative beliefs accounted for 34% of the variance with
R2 of 0.339, with a multiple R of 0.585. In both analyses, BaPS-Survival strategy showed a
small but significant incremental increase in the variance accounted for in the overall model.
Conclusions: These findings suggest that a metacognitive approach to the conceptualization
of paranoia as a strategy for managing interpersonal threat may have some utility. The clinical
implications of the findings are also discussed.
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Introduction
Paranoia has been defined as “a disordered mode of thought that is dominated by an intense,
irrational, but persistent mistrust or suspicion of people and a corresponding tendency to
interpret the actions of others as deliberately threatening or demeaning” (Fenigstein, 1994).
More recently, Freeman and Garety (2000) have defined paranoia as the belief that harm is
occurring or is going to occur, and that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm to
the person. Paranoia occurs across a wide range of psychopathologies, such as depression,
social phobia, personality disorder and psychosis (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
However, far from being a disordered mode of thought, it is now acknowledged that paranoia
is a common experience, which is by no means unique to clinical populations. In his review
of paranoid thinking in non-clinical populations, Freeman (2007) reported a conservative
estimate that 10–15% of the general population regularly experience paranoid thoughts. Some
of the variance in findings across these studies can be accounted for by how paranoid thoughts
are measured. Specifically, more fleeting and transient paranoid thoughts are unlikely to be
recorded in epidemiological studies that use formal diagnostic interview schedules (e.g. Tien
and Anthony, 1990) in contrast to studies that allow for a wider definition of paranoid thinking
(e.g. Johns et al., 2004; Freeman et al., 2005a). Furthermore, Freeman et al. (2005a) found
evidence for a hierarchical structure to paranoid thinking, beginning with relatively common
social evaluative concerns; having ideas of reference (e.g. that people are talking about
you); mildly threatening thoughts (e.g. that people are trying to cause some minor distress);
moderately threatening thoughts (e.g. that people are going out of their way to get at you) and
severely threatening thoughts (e.g. people are trying to cause serious harm and are involved in
conspiracies against you). The weekly occurrence of social evaluative concerns was observed
in 30–40% of respondents, compared to the weekly occurrence of seriously threatening
paranoid thoughts in 5%. This hierarchical model of paranoia can be contrasted with previous
understandings of paranoia. For example, Fenigstein and Vanable (1992) defined sub-clinical
paranoia as a style of thought manifested by exaggerated self-referential biases that arise in
ordinary, daily behaviour. Importantly, this mode of thought was conceptualized as a relatively
consistent bias toward suspiciousness, feelings of resentment and ill will, mistrust, and a belief
in external control. Freeman’s hierarchical organization of paranoia is interesting because it
allows researchers and clinicians to raise questions of what additional factors might contribute
to increasing frequency and distress associated with the ebb and flow of paranoid thinking.
In particular, given that paranoid thoughts are normally occurring and spontaneous appraisals
related to the perceptions of interpersonal threat and danger, it is of interest to investigate
what factors may be associated with the increased availability of such specific threat related
appraisals. Candidate variables that are likely to relate to processes including increased self-
consciousness (e.g. Fenigstein, 1984), the presence of negative affect and emotional distress
(e.g. Freeman, 2007), the tendency to worry (thus increasing the general availability of a
stream of threat related cognitions) (e.g. Morrison and Wells, 2007) and, finally, the beliefs a
person has about paranoia as a helpful strategy, or the extent to which they may fear and thus
become vigilant for and have a ruminative focus on paranoid thoughts (Morrison et al., 2005).
Self-consciousness
Given the close association between paranoid thinking and social evaluative concerns, one
potential factor that may account for increased paranoid thinking is self-consciousness.
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Fenigstein and his colleagues have also emphasized the relationship between self-
consciousness and “paranoia” where paranoia emerges from a tendency to over perceive
oneself as a target (the self-as-target bias) (Fenigstein, 1984; Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992).
Self-focus also plays a central role in self-regulation, and many disorders result from the
inappropriate application of self-regulatory strategies (Carver and Scheier, 1981). In addition,
there is support for the theory that self-focus may operate to activate or increase the availability
of self-referent cognitions and thus influence the emergence of threat appraisals. In a study
of 30 individuals with psychosis, Smari, Stefansson and Thorgilsson (1994) found that
paranoia was associated with increased self-consciousness and social anxiety. Morrison and
Wells (2007) found that delusional distress was predicted by social worry having controlled
for severity of delusional beliefs. The particular finding that social worry was predictive
of delusional distress is consistent with the suggestion that there are clear similarities
and overlapping processes between social anxiety processes, including self-consciousness
and persecutory ideation, and the conceptualization of paranoia as a preoccupation with
interpersonal threat (Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992; Freeman and Garety, 2000).
Negative affectivity
Freeman and Garety (2003) have previously noted the close correspondence between the
content of persecutory beliefs and the accompanying emotions, for example depression
associated with persecutory beliefs about punishment, or anxiety associated with the
perception of other people talking behind a person’s back. Freeman (2007) has shown that the
relationship between persecutory beliefs and anxiety has been repeatedly reported. Paranoid
thoughts build upon common interpersonal anxieties and anxiety has been found to be
predictive of the occurrence of paranoid thoughts (Freeman et al., 2003, 2005b). There is
also evidence that increased depression is associated with more frequent paranoid thoughts.
Green et al. (2008) found moderate associations between the Paranoid Thoughts Scale and
both anxiety and depression (r = 0.39 and 0.50 respectively). Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova and
Southgate (2009) found that depression and anxiety were associated with an increased odds
of experiencing paranoid thoughts (OR = 1.31 and 2.12 respectively).
Worry
Related to anxiety, worry is also a common problem in paranoia. It may be that an increased
tendency to worry, as evidenced by more negative interpretations of general worry related
thoughts, is linked to greater availability of paranoia related thoughts, especially since
paranoid thoughts like worry are threat related appraisals. Similar processes responsible
for the vulnerability to and maintenance of worrying in GAD have also been suggested
as being responsible for the maintenance of delusional distress. Using a clinical sample,
Freeman and Garety (1999) found that, as with distress about worry seen in GAD, delusional
distress was not simply related to the content of thoughts. They found that meta-worry
predicted the use of punishment thought control strategies in both persecutory delusions
and anxiety groups. Patients experiencing delusional beliefs have been found to use more
punishment and worry and less distraction thought control strategies compared to non-
patients (Morrison and Wells, 2000). In addition, the tendency to catastrophize worry
related thoughts is associated with the occurrence of non-clinical paranoia and with the
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maintenance of persecutory delusions (Startup, Freeman and Garety, 2007). Worry is also
given an important role in cognitive models of paranoia (Freeman, 2007). Indeed, in a
study of 24 individuals with persistent persecutory delusions, Foster, Startup, Potts and
Freeman (2010) found that targeting worry in a brief cognitive behavioural intervention
was associated with reductions in worry and in delusional distress. Importantly, change
in worry over 2 months was modestly associated with measures of change in paranoia
(Range r(tau) = 0.34 – 0.49).
Beliefs about paranoia
Morrison et al. (2005) investigated the factor structure of the Beliefs about Paranoia Scale
(BaPS) and whether individuals’ beliefs about paranoia were predictive of their experience
of paranoia and its associated distress in a sample of 317 non-patients. They identified
a 4-factor structure measuring Negative Beliefs about Paranoia (e.g. my paranoia gets
out of control), Paranoia as a Survival Strategy (e.g. it is safer to be paranoid), General
Positive Beliefs (e.g. paranoia can make life seem more exciting and exhilarating) and
Normalizing Beliefs (e.g. being paranoid is just human nature). Using multiple regression,
negative beliefs and survival beliefs were associated with more frequent paranoid thoughts as
measured by the Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992). In contrast, only negative
beliefs were associated with distress associated with delusional ideation as measured by
the Peters Delusions Inventory (Peters, Joseph and Garety, 1999). The finding that both
negative and survival beliefs were associated with more frequent paranoid thoughts is
consistent with a metacognitive conceptualization of paranoia. Paranoia may be employed
as a deliberate strategy for managing interpersonal threat, similar to the use of worry
for dealing with more general threats. The occurrence of negative beliefs about paranoia
was uniquely associated with delusional distress, suggesting that negative beliefs may
be particularly linked to distress arising from paranoia. However, several limitations to
the BaPS were noted. The overall structure of the scale was unbalanced in that Positive
Beliefs and Normalizing Beliefs had a small number of items (n = 4 and 3 respectively). In
addition, the poor internal consistency of these factors (Positive Beliefs = 0.49; Normalizing
Beliefs = 0.60) reflected a need to further develop these factors in order to create a balanced
measure of beliefs about paranoia. Therefore this study aimed to investigate the role of
beliefs about paranoia as predictors of frequency and distress of paranoia in a non-clinical
population. Specifically, this study aimed to (a) revise and strengthen the Beliefs about
Paranoia Scale (BaPS) for initial use in a non-clinical population by confirming the factor
structure of the BaPS using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (EQS, Bentler, 1995).
It was proposed that there would be a 4-factor solution consisting of Negative Beliefs
about Paranoia, Paranoia as a Survival Strategy, General Positive Beliefs, and Normalizing
Beliefs.
We hypothesized that survival beliefs about paranoia would be positively associated with
frequency of paranoia and that negative beliefs about paranoia would be positively associated
with distress about paranoia. We also hypothesized that the use of problematic thought
control strategies (specifically punishment and worry) would be associated with frequency
of paranoia. In testing these hypotheses, we also wished to control for self-consciousness and
levels of anxiety and depression as these factors have been shown to be associated with greater
paranoia.
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Method
Participants and procedure
This study used a cross-sectional design with a sample of first year through to fourth
year undergraduate students attending three higher education institutions. No financial or
educational incentive was offered.
Measures
The Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992) is a 20-item self-report
questionnaire developed to assess frequency of sub clinical levels of paranoia. It is scored
on a 1–5 likert scale with scores ranging from 20–100. The PS was the main dependent
variable for all analyses. Higher scores reflect higher levels of sub clinical paranoia. The
scale has demonstrated good internal consistency (alpha = 0.84) and stability (r = 0.70).
For the purposes of this study the Paranoia Scale was modified to consist of an additional
scale to measure distress for each item measured on a 1–5 likert scale. Internal consistency
of the frequency scale and the distress scale for the current study was good (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.91; 95% CI = 0.88 – 0.92 and alpha = 0.91; 95% CI = 0.87 – 0.92).
The Self-consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss, 1975) measures self-
consciousness dimensions, termed Private and Public Self-consciousness and Social Anxiety.
Fenigstein et al. (1975) obtained high reliability coefficients for private self-consciousness
(alpha = 0.79) and public self-consciousness (alpha = 0.84). Internal consistency for the
current study was good (public: alpha = 0.87; 95% CI = 0.84 – 0.90, private: alpha = 0.70;
95% CI = 0.63 – 0.76, social anxiety: alpha = 0.79; 95% CI = 0.75 – 0.84).
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) consists
of 14 items and asks respondents to rate responses from a range of 0–3. The HADS was
used to measure levels of anxiety and depression. Internal consistency for the anxiety scale
ranged from alpha = 0.76 to 0 .41 and the depression scale ranged from alpha = 0.60 to 0.30.
Internal consistency for the current study was good (anxiety: alpha = 0.88; 95% CI = 0.85 –
0.90) depression: alpha = 0.71; 95% CI = 0.64 – 0.77).
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells and Davies, 1994) is a 30-item self-report
questionnaire that assesses the effectiveness of strategies used for the control of unpleasant
and unwanted thoughts. This measure asks about thoughts in general and is not specific
to paranoid thoughts. Items are scored on a 4-point likert scale. It measures five factors
that agree with different strategies for controlling unwanted thoughts and has good internal
consistency (distraction: alpha = 0.72; social control: alpha = 0.79; punishment: = 0.64;
worry: alpha = 0.64; and reappraisal: alpha = 0.67). Internal consistency was for the current
study ranged from poor to good (distraction: alpha = 0.73; 95% CI = 0.67 – 0.79, social
control: alpha = 0.30; 95% CI = 0.14 – 0.45, punishment: = 0.56; 95% CI = 0.45 – 0.65,
worry: alpha = 0.83; 95% CI = 0.79 – 0.86 and reappraisal: alpha = 0.72; 95% CI = 0.65 –
0.78).
The Beliefs about Paranoia Scale (BaPS; Morrison et al., 2005) is a self-report
questionnaire developed to measure metacognitive processes involved in paranoia by
measuring positive and negative beliefs about paranoia. It consists of a number of attitudes and
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thoughts that people have expressed about paranoia based on clinical knowledge of patients
experiencing persecutory delusions. Items on the questionnaire were generated to measure
hypothesized latent variable structures of negative beliefs about paranoia, positive beliefs
about paranoia as an interesting way of thinking, as a survival strategy, and normalizing
beliefs. A 50-item questionnaire was developed following preliminary validation of the
31-item version of the questionnaire in a previous study (Morrison et al., 2005) using
confirmatory factor analysis that suggested a 4-factor model of the BaPS, and that further
scale development was desirable as the General Positive Beliefs and Normalizing Beliefs only
had 4 and 3 items respectively. The scoring of the version used in this study was the same as
Morrison et al. (2005).
Data analyses
Data were analysed using SPSS for Windows Version 11.5, and the structural equation
modelling package EQS, Version 6.1 for Windows (Bentler, 1995) was used to test the
goodness of fit of the BaPS to a 4-factor solution. Prior to formal factor analyses, the inter-
item correlation matrix was examined to see if there was a predominance of correlations
above 0.3 among the items supporting the suitability for factoring as recommended by Kline
(1994). The adequacy of competing models of the BaPS was assessed through an examination
of a variety of fit indices. Overall and incremental model fit was examined by model chi-
squared (χ2) and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI: Bentler, 1995). A significant χ2 suggests
that the data depart significantly from the model. A CFI <0.90 indicates that the model is an
inadequate description of the data, whereas a model with CFI > 0.95 is regarded as fitting the
data well (Bentler and Bonnet, 1980). The Root Mean Square of Approximation (RMSEA) is
also reported where values greater than 0.1 are taken as indicative of a poor fit of the data, the
rule of thumb suggested by Browne and Cudeck (1993).
Prior to the multiple regression analyses, dependent and predictor variables were checked
for multicollinearity by examination of an inter-item correlation matrix where values above
0.80 (Field, 2000, p. 132), VIF >10 (Myers, 1990), and tolerance statistics <0.1 (Bowerman
and O’Connell, 1990) would suggest that multicollinearity was a problem. Predictor variables
were checked for independent residuals using Durbin-Watson test statistic (Durbin and
Watson, 1951) where values <1 or >3 would indicate residuals were correlated. They
were also checked for the presence of outliers and extreme cases of residual statistics by
examination of standardized residuals for values >3, Cook’s distance for values >1 (Cook
and Weisberg, 1982), which would indicate the model was a poor fit of the data and that
outliers may be present. Linearity and homoscedasticity were checked by the examination
of standardized residual scatterplots; finally histograms and normal probability plots were
examined to check for normally distributed residuals as recommended by Field (2000, p. 158).
The dependent variables, frequency of paranoid thoughts and distress about paranoid
thoughts and the predictor variables were each entered into two multiple regression analyses:
hierarchical, then stepwise. The hierarchical method was selected because it was of interest to
investigate the contribution of the new predictors (BaPS) to the predictors that have existing
support in the literature of their relationship to paranoia. Stepwise was selected because
the hierarchical models included several non-significant coefficients, indicating that these
variables did not contribute much to the model. The stepwise method of model selection
resulted in only significant predictors added into the regression equation and a smaller but
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics from standardized measures
Variable Mean
Standard
deviation Median Range Skewness Kurtosis Alpha
Paranoia Scale
Frequency 37.19 11.82 35.00 20–82 0.925 0.690 0.91
Distress 35.75 12.05 34.00 20–72 0.846 0.231 0.91
Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale
Anxiety 7.82 4.37 7.00 0–19 0.376 −0.657 0.88
Depression 2.97 2.61 2.00 0–11 0.862 −0.010 0.71
Self-Consciousness
Scale
Public 14.63 6.47 14.00 1–28 0.126 −0.911 0.87
Private 18.49 5.73 18.00 6–36 0.407 0.043 0.70
Social anxiety 11.94 5.41 12.00 0–24 −0.097 −0.728 0.79
Thought Control
Questionnaire
Distraction 14.68 2.97 14.00 6–23 0.328 −0.095 0.73
Social control 12.84 2.57 13.00 6–20 −0.056 0.598 0.30
Punishment 9.80 2.30 9.00 6–21 1.024 1.580 0.56
Worry 9.83 3.10 9.00 6–20 0.893 0.693 0.83
Reappraisal 13.61 3.21 14.00 6–22 0.257 −0.159 0.72
significant model of predictors. The order of measures entered into the regression was age
and gender, self-consciousness, anxiety and depression, thought control and then beliefs about
paranoia. We wished to enter the measures in this way in order to ensure that other explanatory
variables were controlled for before evaluating the contribution of beliefs about paranoia.
Both hierarchical and stepwise models are presented. Based on Green (1991) the number
of participants required was calculated on basis of N > 50 + 8x where x = n of independent
variables (n = 15) the required sample size to test the variables selected for our model was 170.
Results
Participant characteristics
The number or participants completing the questionnaires was 185. The mean age of the group
was 23.17 (SD = 6.13; range 17–39 years). The male: female ratio was 39:142 (data missing
for seven cases). Descriptive data from the standardized measures are presented in Table 1.
Four factor model
Examination of the inter-item correlation matrix revealed a predominance of correlations
above 0.3 among the items supporting suitability for factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer
(KMO) measure provides a further means for assessing the homogeneity of variables.
The overall KMO measure was 0.89, which was above the suggested minimum of 0.60
(Tabachnick and Fiddell, 1996), indicating that the correlation matrix was suitable for
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factoring. Eight items (items 10, 12, 18, 30, 37, 39, 41, and 50) of the BaPS showed a limited
range of endorsements, with more than 80% of scores in the “not at all category”. Therefore,
two confirmatory factor analyses were performed with and without items with frequency
problems. Both the original 50-item questionnaire and then the 42-item questionnaire, where
the eight items with frequency problems were removed, proved to be a poor fit of the data
(χ2 = 1052.10, p < .00; χ2 = 6048.43, p < .00). The CFI were 0.70 and 0.77 and the RSMEA
were 0.11 and 0.11. It was therefore appropriate to examine the possible structure of the
observed correlations using exploratory factor analysis.
Having removed the eight problematic outcomes, a Principal Components Analysis was
performed on the 42 items in order to reduce the variables to a smaller number of components
by examining the Scree plot (Cattell, 1966) and percentage of variance explained. The Scree
test revealed a clear break in slope between four and five factors; therefore four factors were
specified in a maximum likelihood factor analysis using a varimax rotation. The rotated
loadings indicated that the fourth factor was problematic, with only three items from the
original hypothesized “interesting beliefs” factor loading highly. The fourth item “people who
are not paranoid are just not getting it” was originally from the “normalizing beliefs” factor
and therefore did not load onto its original factor as expected. All of the four items loading
onto factor four had frequency problems. The four factors explained 31.53 (F1), 12.13 (F2),
8.4 (F3) and 4.0 (F4) per cent of the variance.
Three factor model
There were several reasons for rejecting the original 4-factor model. An inadequate fit of the
4-factor model was demonstrated by CFA. There were frequency problems for the four items
that loaded onto the fourth factor. In addition, many of the original items that were constructed
for factor four appeared ambiguous and therefore difficult for respondents to answer.
Therefore the selection of a 3-factor model was deemed appropriate. A maximum likelihood
factor analysis was performed using varimax rotation specifying three factors with all items
originally constructed for factor four omitted from this analysis. The first three factors had the
following eigenvalues: 12.79, 5.22, and 3.65 and explained 32.76 (F1), 13.40 (F2) and 9.37
(F3) per cent of the variance. Thereafter, the eigenvalues for the next three components were
1.31, 1.16 and 1.02. A CFA was performed on this 38-item version of the BAPS, resulting in
a better fit of the data on all indices apart from χ2, which remained significant (χ2 = 1432.5,
p < .00; CFI = 0.81; RMSEA = 0.08). Finally, the six items with the highest loading on
each factor were retained, resulting in an 18-item questionnaire comprising six items in each
factor. A test of the 3-factor model indicated that although the chi-squared test of overall
model fit remained significant (χ2 = 312.46, p < .00), the other indices indicated a good fit,
with the RMSEA value now 0.9 and the CFI was 0.92. The χ2 is extremely sensitive with
small variations in fit resulting in statistically significant and sizeable χ2 (Hu and Bentler,
1995). Despite this index, the abbreviated 3-factor model was deemed a good fit of the data.
A summary of the results from all the confirmatory factor analyses are presented in Table 2.
Internal consistency of the BAPS (18 item)
Internal consistency was examined for the 18-item BaPS using Cronbach’s alpha computed
for the total scale and the three subscales. The scale demonstrated good internal consistency
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Table 2. Fit indices for CFA models of the BaPS
Model Chi-square CFI RMSEA
Four-factor model (50 item questionnaire) 1052.10 (p < .00) 0.70 0.11
Four-factor model (42 item questionnaire) 6048.43 (p < .00) 0.77 0.11
Three-factor model (38 item) 1432.5 (p < .00) 0.81 0.08
Three-factor model (18 item questionnaire) 312.46 (p < .00) 0.92 0.90
with alphas of 0.89; 95% CI = 0.87 – 0.91 (FI), 0.90; 95% CI = 0.87 – 0.92 (F2); 0.93; 95%
CI = 0.91 – 0.94 (F3); and 0.89; 95% CI = 0.87 – 0.91 for the total scale. Items and their
loadings for the 3-factor model are presented in Table 3.
Predictors of frequency of and distress about paranoia
The examination of the inter-item correlation matrix and tolerance index indicated that
multicollinearity was not a problem. All assumptions necessary for multiple regressions were
met. Hierarchical (blockwise entry) and stepwise multiple regression analyses were performed
to examine the hypotheses that paranoia frequency is associated with positive beliefs about
paranoia, punishment, worry and reappraisal thought control strategies and negative beliefs
about paranoia are associated with higher distress about paranoia in a non clinical sample.
For hierarchical models, the predictor variables were entered in the following order: SCS
subscales; HADS subscales; TCQ subscales; and finally the BAPS subscales. The correlation
matrix for all predictor and outcome variables and the results of the multiple regression
analyses for paranoia frequency and paranoia distress are presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6
respectively.
Predictors of paranoia frequency
In the hierarchical method of multiple regression, on step 1 when age and gender were entered
the multiple R was 0.157, R2 was 0.025, adjusted R2 was 0.019 and significant (F = 4.08,
p = .045). On step 2, when the SCS variables were entered the multiple R was 0.651, R2 was
0.423, adjusted R2 was 0.409, and the increment in R2 0.398 and significant (F = 36.41, p <
.001). On step 3 when the HADS variables were entered the multiple R was 0.740, R2 was
0.548, the adjusted R2 was 0.530 and the increment in R2 0.125 was significant (F = 21.47,
p < .001). On step 4 when the TCQ variables were entered the multiple R was 0.774, R2 was
0.599, the adjusted R2 was .570, the increment in R2 of 0.051 was significant (F = 3.85, p <
.05). On the final step when the BAPS variables were entered, the multiple R was 0.818, the R2
was 0.669, adjusted R2 was 0.638 and the increment in R2 of 0.070 was significant (F = 10.51,
p < .001), showing that the addition of the BAPS items accounted for an additional 7.0% of
the variance.
When all predictor variables (n = 15) were entered into the model, the stepwise method
indicated that seven variables remained significant for inclusion into the model and accounted
for 63% of the variance. BaPS-negative beliefs accounted for 34.5% of the variance with R2
of 0.345, with a multiple R of 0.587. HADS depression accounted for an additional 13.8%
of the variance with an increment in R2 of 0.138, R2 of 0.483 and multiple R of 0.695. SCS
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Table 3. Factor loadings of the BAPS (three-factor model) from Maximum Likelihood
Factor Analysis using varimax rotation
Loadings on factors
Item/scale 1 2 3
Factor 1: Survival strategy
It is important to be paranoid .751 −.021 .176
If I were not paranoid others would take advantage of me .720 .202 .196
It is safer to be paranoid .770 .101 .151
My paranoia keeps me on my toes .713 .218 .114
Being paranoid keeps me sharp .730 .018 .236
My paranoia protects me .746 .109 .164
My paranoia is useful for avoiding trouble .531 .152 .203
In the past if I had not been paranoid I could have got hurt .475 .265 .226
Bad things happen so it helps to be paranoid .675 .336 .146
Being paranoid or suspicious keeps me safe from harm .685 .115 .261
If I were not paranoid then I would lose control .637 .169 .042
My paranoia keeps people off my back .521 .216 .128
My paranoia is a coping strategy .532 .399 .061
Factor 2: Negative beliefs
My paranoia gets out of control .094 .761 .050
I get upset when I feel paranoid .005 .708 .133
My paranoia prevents me from doing things I enjoy .216 .695 −.135
My paranoid thoughts worry me .151 .795 .054
My paranoia gets exaggerated −.008 .751 .224
My paranoia distresses me −.034 .850 .147
My paranoia stops me from talking to some people .275 .501 −.063
My paranoia stops me from feeling close to others .241 .594 −.092
My paranoia upsets other people .130 .664 .025
My paranoia means I have difficulty trusting others .271 .687 .091
I will always feel paranoid to some extent .367 .591 .363
Life has taught me to be paranoid of other people .434 .540 .222
Factor 3: Normalizing beliefs
Everybody feels paranoia at some time or other .049 .152 .860
Most people get paranoid sometimes .035 .119 .873
Paranoia is normal .287 −.033 .703
Everybody is paranoid on some level .191 .119 .842
Paranoia is something everybody has to some extent .240 .052 .836
Being paranoid is just human nature .249 .084 .757
It is a paranoid world .267 .322 .221
My paranoia is just a reflection of the way things are .496 .400 .183
Everybody I know is paranoid sometimes .052 .276 .668
Paranoia is a normal part of life .341 −.006 .586
If you were never paranoid then you would be strange .275 .016 .447
It’s okay to be a little paranoid .349 −.067 .693
People who are not paranoid are just not getting it .474 .029 .316
(Items emboldened were retained to form the 18 item BAPS).
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Table 4. Correlation matrix for paranoia frequency, paranoia distress and predictor variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. PS- frequency
2. PS-distress .831∗∗
3. SCS-private .510∗∗ .444∗∗
4. SCS-public .507∗∗ .530∗∗ .432∗∗
5. SCS-social anxiety .427∗∗ .457∗∗ .152∗ .521∗∗
6. HADS- anxiety .580∗∗ .536∗∗ .394∗∗ .492∗∗ .436∗∗
7. HADS-depression .560∗∗ .517∗∗ 3350∗∗ .293∗∗ .250∗∗ .585∗∗
8. TCQ-distraction –.013 .018 .056 .101 .067 .054 .006
9. TCQ-punishment .409∗∗ .471∗∗ .214∗∗ .287∗∗ .342∗∗ .352∗∗ .237∗ .163∗
10. TCQ-reappraisal .121 .143 .381∗∗ .174 –.027 .150∗ .043 .131 .012
11. TCQ-worry .545∗∗ .474∗∗ .343∗∗ .385∗∗ .274∗∗ .540∗∗ .392∗∗ .126 .457∗∗ .256∗∗
12. TCQ-social control .266∗∗ .245∗∗ .360∗∗ .235∗∗ .190∗∗ .155∗ .066 .308∗∗ .203∗∗ .299∗∗ .343∗∗
∗∗Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ∗Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
46 A. I. Gumley et al.
Table 5. Multiple regression statistics for paranoia frequency
R R2 Adjusted R2 F Sig. of F Beta∗ Partial r∗
Hierarchical model
Gender 0.157 0.025 0.019 4.082 0.045 0.026 0.26
Age −0.118 −0.122
SCS Private 0.651 0.423 0.409 36.416 0.000 0.220 0.290
SCS Public 0.103 0.131
SCS Social Anxiety 0.044 0.056
HADS Depression 0.740 0.548 0.530 21.467 0.000 0.240 0.280
HADS Anxiety 0.008 0.009
TCQ distraction 0.774 0.599 0.570 3.852 0.003 −0.067 −0.102
TCQ reappraisal −0.071 −0.101
TCQ punishment 0.076 0.106
TCQ social control 0.051 0.073
TCQ worry 0.105 0.125
BAPS normal 0.818 0.669 0.638 10.512 0.000 −0.036 −0.054
BAPS strategy 0.183 0.256
BAPS negative 0.279 0.359
Stepwise model
BAPS negative 0.587 0.345 0.341 84.785 0.000 0.299 0.399
HADS depression 0.695 0.483 0.477 42.812 0.000 0.265 0.364
SCS Private 0.742 0.550 0.542 23.617 0.000 0.211 0.297
BAPS strategy 0.771 0.594 0.584 17.190 0.000 0.190 0.288
Age 0.794 0.630 0.618 15.055 0.000 −0.154 −0.237
TCQ punishment 0.803 0.645 0.631 6.549 0.011 0.123 0.184
SCS Public 0.809 0.654 0.639 4.485 0.040 0.121 0.164
∗The standardized regression coefficient or beta and the partial correlation are shown, which indicated
the importance of the independent contribution of each variable at the final stage of analysis to the
prediction of paranoia frequency when all other predictors are held constant.
private accounted for an additional 6.7% of the variance with an increment in R2 of 0.067,
R2 of 0.550, and a multiple R of 0.742. The multiple R for BaPS strategy was 0.771; R2 was
0.594 with an increment of 0.029. Age accounted for 3.6% of the variance with an increment
in R2 of 0.036, R2 of 0.630 and multiple R of 0.794. For TCQ-punishment the multiple R was
0.803, R2 was 0.645 and increment of 0.015. For SCS Public, multiple R was 0.809, R2 was
0.654, and adjusted R2 was 0.639 with an increment of 0.009.
Predictors of paranoia distress
In the hierarchical method of multiple regression, on step 1 age and gender were entered the
multiple R was 0.186, R2 was 0.034 and adjusted R2 0.029 and significant (F = 5.784, p <
.05). On step 2 when the SCS variables were entered the multiple R was 0.642, R2 was 0.412,
the adjusted R2 was 0.397, the increment of R2 0.378 and significant (F = 34.04, p < .001).
On step 3 when the HADS variables were entered the multiple R was 0.706, R2 was 0.499,
adjusted R2 0.480, and increment in R2 was 0.087 and significant (F = 13.61, p < .001). On
step 4 when the TCQ variables were entered the multiple R was 0.743, R2 was 0.552, adjusted
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Table 6. Multiple regression statistics for paranoia distress
R R2 Adjusted R2 F Sig. of F Beta∗ Partial r∗
Hierarchical model
Gender 0.186 0.034 0.029 5.784 0.017 0.136 0.137
Age −0.150 −0.211
SCS Private 0.642 0.412 0.397 34.041 0.000 0.144 0.182
SCS Public 0.140 0.164
SCS Social Anxiety 0.096 0.144
HADS Depression 0.706 0.499 0.480 13.611 0.000 0.239 0.276
HADS Anxiety −0.051 −0.055
TCQ distraction 0.743 0.552 0.520 3.607 0.004 −0.060 −0.084
TCQ reappraisal −0.006 −0.009
TCQ punishment 0.202 0.254
TCQ social control 0.027 0.036
TCQ worry −0.007 −0.008
BAPS normal 0.786 0.617 0.581 8.465 0.000 0.025 0.034
BAPS strategy 0.158 0.208
BAPS negative 0.263 0.359
Stepwise model
BAPS negative 0.556 0.309 0.305 72.406 0.000 0.259 0.338
SCS Public 0.658 0.433 0.426 35.265 0.000 0.145 0.185
HADS Depression 0.709 0.502 0.493 22.265 0.000 0.243 0.320
TCQ Punishment 0.734 0.539 0.527 12.653 0.000 0.119 0.277
BAPS Survival 0.755 0.569 0.556 11.143 0.001 0.165 0.242
Age 0.768 0.591 0.575 8.114 0.005 −0.165 −0.242
SCS Private 0.779 0.607 0.590 6.657 0.011 0.149 0.205
Gender 0.786 0.618 0.598 4.351 0.039 0.107 0.165
∗The standardized regression coefficient or beta and the partial correlation are shown, which indicated
the importance of the independent contribution of each variable at the final stage of analysis to the
prediction of paranoia frequency when all other predictors are held constant.
R2 was 0.520 and the increment in R2 was 0.053 and significant (F = 3.607, p < .05). On step
5 when the BAPS variables were entered the multiple R was 0.786, R2 was 0.617, the adjusted
R2 0.581 and the increment of 0.065 was significant (F = 8.465, p < .001).
When all predictor variables (n = 15) were entered into the model, the stepwise method
indicated that eight variables remained significant and accounted for 61.8% of the variance.
BaPS-negative accounted for 30.9% of the variance, with a multiple R of 0.556, and R2 of
0.309. For SCS public, the multiple R was 0.658, R2 was 0.433, adjusted R2 was 0.426 and
the increment in R2 was 0.124. For HADS depression, the multiple R was 0.709, R2 was 0.502,
adjusted R2 was 0.493 and the increment in R2 was 0.069. TCQ punishment had a multiple
R of 0.734, R2 0.539, adjusted R2 0.0.527 with an increment of 0.037. BaPS Survival had a
multiple R of 0.755, R2 of 0.569, and adjusted R2 of 0.556 with an increment of 0.030. Age
had a multiple R of 0.768, R2 of 0.591, adjusted R2 of 0.575 and increment of 0.022. SCS
Private had a multiple R of 0.779, R2 of 0.607, adjusted R2 of 0.590 and increment of 0.016.
Gender had a multiple R of 0.786, R2 of 0.618, adjusted R2 of 0.598 and increment of 0.011.
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Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of beliefs about paranoia as predictors of
frequency and distress of paranoia in a non-clinical population. The results of the empirical
validation of the 50-item BaPS demonstrated that the original BaPS, which hypothesized
a 4-factor solution, was a poor fit of the data. This was demonstrated in confirmatory
and exploratory factor analyses. The final 18-item BaPS was found to demonstrate good
internal reliability. The 18-item BaPS measured three distinct subscales regarding beliefs
about paranoia. Despite the rejection of the fourth factor, general positive beliefs, the three
factors survival beliefs, normalizing beliefs and negative beliefs were found to be distinct
factors measured by the BaPS. There is an important need to replicate these findings regarding
the 3-factor structure of the BaPS, preferably in a clinical population.
Our hypothesis that positive beliefs about paranoia would be associated with paranoia
frequency was not fully supported. Whilst we found that positive beliefs about paranoia as
a survival strategy were selected as a predictor of paranoia frequency in the stepwise model,
this effect was small and the negative beliefs about paranoia predicted a larger proportion of
the variance (34.5% versus 2.9%). This was an interesting finding, which opens up further
understanding of a metacognitive conceptualization of paranoia. These findings suggest an
important role for negative beliefs about paranoia playing an important role in the prediction
of the frequency of paranoid thoughts. It may be that negative beliefs about paranoia are
associated with increased vigilance towards paranoid thoughts as a source of threat, thus
increasing attentional deployment towards thoughts and images concerning interpersonal
threat. This finding is potentially consistent with Wells’ (1995) metacognitive model of
worry, where negative beliefs about worry lead to increased ruminative focus on worry
related thoughts. Furthermore, similar negative metacognitive beliefs are associated with
predisposition to hallucinations in non-clinical and clinical samples (Morrison, Wells and
Nothard, 2002; Baker and Morrison, 1998). In a clinical group of 27 individuals diagnosed
with schizophrenia, we found that negative beliefs about paranoia were associated with
increased re-experiencing of traumatic memories linked to Post Psychotic PTSD (White and
Gumley, 2009). We also found that negative beliefs about paranoia were associated with
increased intolerance of uncertainty, a construct closely associated with worrying (White and
Gumley, in press).
We also observed that public and private self-consciousness were also significant predictors
of paranoia frequency. Fenigstein and Vanable (1992) found that high levels of public
self-consciousness in non-clinical participants were associated with paranoia frequency.
Self-consciousness is suggested to increase the extent to which participants perceive another’s
behaviour as being directed towards them (Fenigstein, 1984). The finding that frequency of
paranoid ideation is related to self-consciousness is therefore not unexpected and is consistent
with the hierarchical account of paranoid thinking as described by Freeman et al. (2005a).
The finding that depression was also a significant predictor of paranoia frequency is also of
interest. On the one hand, this may well be consistent with a negative ruminative focus which
has been observed in depression and which was suggested by the findings for negative beliefs
about paranoia. On the other hand, the Fenigstein Scale has been criticized as some of the
items are negatively affectively valenced (Freeman et al., 2005a). It may be that the finding
that HADS depression predicts frequency of paranoia is a reflection of overlapping items.
We also note that the Fenigstein Scale was originally designed as a trait measure of paranoia.
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More recently the Paranoid Thoughts Scale (Freeman et al., 2005a) has been developed and
this may well have been a better measure of frequency of paranoid thoughts. We also note
that the restricted range of variance indicated by low scores on Fenigstein Scale and the
low score on HAS depression scale may also have increased the magnitude of association
observed in this analysis.
The hypothesis that negative beliefs concerning appraisals of uncontrollability,
exaggeration, worry and distress in relation to paranoid thoughts would be associated with
distress about paranoia gained substantial support. This finding is consistent with Freeman
and Garety (1999) who found a positive association between delusional distress and the
individual’s experiences of meta-worry concerning the control of delusion related worries.
This is supportive of the metacognitive prediction of the S-REF model (Wells and Mathews,
1994) that metacognitive beliefs about mental experiences are associated with vulnerability to
psychological disorder, and confirms the suggestion that negative beliefs about paranoia are
associated with distress in response to paranoid ideation (Morrison et al., 2005).
Punishment was also found to be a significant predictor of paranoia frequency. Although
worry was a non-significant predictor, the finding that distraction had a negative relationship
with paranoia frequency is supportive of the finding that patients experiencing delusional
beliefs and hallucinations used more punishment and worry and less distraction thought
control strategies compared to non-patients (Morrison and Wells, 2000). Overall, these
findings are consistent with the S-REF model’s (Wells and Mathews, 1994) prediction that
metacognitive dysfunctional plans for processing, such as use of punishment, are related to
emotional dysfunction maintenance.
This study has several methodological limitations that require to be addressed. Although
analogue research is increasingly being used in the field of psychosis research (e.g. Morrison
et al., 2002; Morrison and Petersen, 2003), the use of non-clinical participants limits
generalizability of findings to clinical populations. It cannot be assumed that the same
metacognitive processes are operating in clinical populations. However, this study was
investigating metacognitive beliefs and processes involved in sub-clinical levels of paranoia.
Combs, Penn and Fenigstein (2002) argues that the assessment of sub-clinical paranoia is
important, as demonstrated by current conceptualizations of psychosis, such as that of Bentall,
Jackson and Pilgrim (1988), where symptoms are described as existing on a continuum,
as opposed to separate, categorical entities. It may be argued that the identification of
metacognitive processes operating in non-clinical paranoia will enable the identification of
variables involved in the transition to clinical paranoia.
Further limitations concern the use of a correlational, cross sectional design, which
prevents inferences of causality being made. It is suggested that eliciting the causal role of
metacognitive beliefs in predisposition to paranoia and distress would involve longitudinal
or experimental designs. Furthermore, the current study utilised a convenience sample; this
limits the potential to assess the generalizability of these findings (Robson, 1993, p. 72). A
consequence of convenience sampling is that caution is required when attempting to make
statistical inferences about other populations from the responses of this population. Another
limitation was that the sample was predominantly female and it is possible that the findings
were influenced by gender.
This study would have been enhanced by investigation of physiological effects of factors
such as drug use and sleep deprivation, both of which are suggested as being implicated in
the development and maintenance of psychosis symptoms (Morrison et al., 2005). There is
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increasing evidence that cannabis may induce paranoid phenomena such as delusions, for
example (Mathews, Wilson, Humphreys, Lowe and Weithe, 1993), and this study did not
investigate this. In addition, there was no investigation of traumatic life experiences, which
have an association with the themes expressed in psychosis phenomena, such as delusions
(Raune, Kuipers and Bebbington, 1999).
It is also important to acknowledge that in no way did we seek to offer participants a
specific definition of paranoia. This was so as not to constrain their participation in the
study. This in itself is also a methodological limitation in that we are not able to be sure
that our participants would construct paranoia in the same way as clinical participants. We
are encouraged, however, that our findings in this study are consistent with our findings from
initial clinical studies where negative beliefs about paranoia are associated with persecutory
delusions (Morrison et al., in press), re-experiencing of traumatic memories of psychosis
(White and Gumley, 2009) and greater propensity towards worrying as reflected in Intolerance
of Uncertainty (White and Gumley, in press).
Future research is required to assess the application of the BaPS with clinical populations.
In addition, the sensitivity of the BaPS to therapeutic change remains to be examined. The
metacognitive model presented in this study will be enhanced by further understanding of
cognitive responses involved in maintenance that are unique to paranoia. Furthermore, we
hypothesize that Beliefs about Paranoia are linked to the strategic deployment of attentional
resources towards thoughts and images concerning interpersonal threat. This model assumes
that paranoid thoughts are normally occurring (Freeman et al., 2005a). It is also important to
distinguish beliefs about paranoia from the moment by moment interpretations of paranoid
thoughts, which may be highly idiosyncratic or linked to other emotional responses including
shame, embarrassment and stigma. The TCQ was used for this purpose and it was originally
developed for use with intrusive thoughts, and not for use with psychosis phenomena. Further
development of standardized measures of metacognitive processes involved in maintenance
of paranoia is required.
The development of a metacognitive model of paranoia has several important implications
for clinical practice. First, one of the targets of assessment will be an examination of the
positive beliefs that an individual holds in relation to their paranoia. If the individual views
paranoia as a survival strategy, then it is paramount that they are provided with an alternative,
functional, replacement strategy. Second, treatment will be enhanced by the identification
of the negative beliefs the individual holds about their paranoid thoughts, as suggested by
Morrison, Renton, Dunn, Williams and Bentall (2003). This will assist in reducing associated
distress. Third, the identification of dysfunctional coping strategies, such as use of punishment
thought control, will enable the maintenance of the individual’s paranoia to be targeted. This
is essential for the long-term success of cognitive therapy with paranoia.
References
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(Rev. 4th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
Baker, C. A. and Morrison, A. P. (1998). Cognitive processes in auditory hallucinations: attributional
biases and metacognition. Psychological Medicine, 28, 1199–1208.
Bentall, R. P., Jackson, H. G. and Pilgrim, D. (1988). Abandoning the concept of schizophrenia:
some implications of validity arguments for psychological research into psychotic phenomena. British
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 27, 156–169.
Beliefs about paranoia 51
Bentler, P. M. (1995). Comparative fit indices in structural models. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 238–
246.
Bentler, P. M. and Bonett, D. G. (1980). Significance tests and goodness of fit in the analysis of
covariance structures. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 588–606.
Bowerman, B. L. and O’Connell, R. T. (1990). Linear Statistical Models: an applied approach (2nd
edn.). Belmont, CA: Duxbury.
Browne, M. W. and Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In K. A. Bollen
and J. S. Long (Eds.), Testing Structural Equation Models (pp. 136–162). Newbury Park, CA:
Sage.
Cartwright-Hatton, S. and Wells, A. (1997). Beliefs about worry and intrusions: the metacognitions
questionnaire and its correlates. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 11, 279–296.
Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. (1981). Attention and Self-Regulation: a control theory approach to
human behaviour. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Cattell, R. B. (1966). The Scree test for number of factors. Mulitvariate Behavioural Research, 1, 245–
276.
Combs, D. R., Penn, D. and Fenigstein, A. (2002). Ethnic differences in sub-clinical paranoia: an
expansion of norms of the paranoia scale. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 8,
248–256.
Cook, R. D. and Weisberg, S. (1982). Residuals and Influence in Regression. New York: Chapman and
Hall.
Durbin, J. and Watson, G. S. (1951). Testing for serial correlation in least squares regression, II.
Biometrika, 30, 159–178.
Field, A. (2000). Discovering Statistics using SPSS for Windows. London: Sage Publications.
Fenigstein, A. (1984). Self-consciousness and the over-perception of self as a target. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 860–870.
Fenigstein, A. (1994). Paranoia. In H. Friedman (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Mental Health, 3, (p. 83). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F. and Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness:
assessment and theory. Journal of Clinical and Consulting Psychology, 43, 522–527.
Fenigstein, A. and Vanable, P. A. (1992). Paranoia and self-consciousness. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 62, 129–138.
Foster, C., Startup, H., Potts, L. and Freeman, D. (2010). A randomised controlled trial of a worry
intervention for individuals with persistent persecutory delusions. Journal of Behaviour Therapy and
Experimental Psychiatry, 41, 45–51.
Freeman, D. (2007). Suspicious minds: the psychology of persecutory delusions. Clinical Psychology
Review, 27, 425–457.
Freeman, D. and Garety, P. A. (1999). Worry, worry processes and dimensions of delusions: an
exploratory investigation of a role for anxiety processes in the maintenance of delusional distress.
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 27, 47–62.
Freeman, D. and Garety, P. A. (2000). Comments on the contents of persecutory delusions: does the
definition require clarification? British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 39, 407–414.
Freeman, D. and Garety, P. A. (2003). Connecting neurosis and psychosis: the direct influence of
emotion on delusions and hallucinations. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 923–947.
Freeman, D., Garety, P. A., Bebbington, P. E., Smith, B., Rollinson, R., Fowler, D., Kuipers, E.,
Katarzyna, R. and Dunn, G. (2005a). Psychological investigation of structure of paranoia in a non-
clinical population. British Journal of Psychiatry, 186, 427–435.
Freeman, D., Garety, P. A., Bebbington, P., Slater, M., Kuipers, E., Fowler, D., Green, C., Jordan,
J., Ray, K. and Dunn, G. (2005b). The psychology of persecutory ideation II: a virtual reality
experimental study. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 193, 309–315.
Freeman, D., Pugh, K., Vorontsova, N. and Southgate, L. (2009). Insomnia and paranoia.
Schizophrenia Research, 108, 280–284.
52 A. I. Gumley et al.
Freeman, D., Slater, M., Bebbington, P. E., Garety, P. A., Kuipers, E., Fowler, D., Met, A., Read, C.,
Jordan, J. and Vinayagamoorthy, V. (2003). Can virtual reality be used to investigate persecutory
ideation? Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 191, 509−514.
Green, S. B. (1991). How many subjects does it take to do a regression analysis? Multivariate
Behavioural Research, 26, 499–510.
Green, C., Freeman, D., Kuipers, E., Bebbington, P., Fowler, D., Dunn, G. and Garety, P. (2008).
Measuring ideas of persecution and reference: the Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (G-PTS).
Psychological Medicine, 38, 101–111.
Hu, L. T. and Bentler, P. M. (1995). Evaluating model fit. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), Structural Equation
Modelling: concepts, issues and applications (pp. 77–99). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Johns, L. C., Cannon, M., Singleton, M., Murray, R. M., Farrell, M., Brugha, T., Bebbington,
P., Jenkins, R. and Meltzer, H. (2004). The prevalence and correlates of self reported psychotic
symptoms in the British population. British Journal of Psychiatry, 185, 298–305.
Kline, P. (1994). An Easy Guide to Factor Analysis. London: Routlege.
Mathews, R., Wilson, W., Humphreys, D., Lowe, J. and Weithe, K. (1993). Depersonalisation after
marijuana smoking. Biological Psychiatry, 33, 431–441.
Morrison, A. P., Gumley, A., Ashcroft, K., Manousos, R., White, R. and Kingdon, D. (in press).
Metacognition and persecutory delusions: a validation of the Beliefs about Paranoia Scale in a clinical
population. British Journal of Clinical Psychology.
Morrison, A. P., Gumley, A. I., Schwannauer, M., Campbell, M., Gleeson, A., Griffin, E. and
Gillan, K. (2005). The Beliefs about Paranoia Scale: preliminary validation of a metacognitive
approach to conceptualizing paranoia. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 33, 153–164.
Morrison, A. and Petersen, T. (2003). Trauma, metacognition and hallucinations. Behavioural and
Cognitive Psychotherapy, 31, 235–246.
Morrison, A. P., Renton, J. C., Dunn, H., Williams, S. and Bentall, R. P. (2003). Cognitive Therapy
for Psychosis: a formulation-based approach. London: Psychology Press.
Morrison, A. P. and Wells, A. (2000). Thought control strategies in schizophrenia: a comparison with
non-patients. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 1205–1209.
Morrison, A. P. and Wells, A. (2007). Relationships between worry, psychotic experiences and
emotional distress in patients with schizophrenia spectrum diagnoses and comparisons with anxious
and non-patient groups. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 1593–1600.
Morrison, A. P., Wells, A. and Nothard, S. (2002). Cognitive and emotional predictors of
predisposition to hallucinations in non-patients. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 41, 259–
270.
Myers, R. (1990). Classical and Modern Regression with Applications (2nd edn). Boston, MA:
Duxbury.
Peters, E. R., Joseph, S. A. and Garety, P. A. (1999). Measurement of delusional ideation in the
normal population: introducing the PDI (Peters et al., Delusions Inventory). Schizophrenia Bulletin,
25, 553–576.
Raune, D., Kuipers, E. and Bebbington, P. (1999). Psychosocial Stress and Delusional and Verbal
Auditory Hallucination Themes in First Episode Psychosis: implications for early intervention. Paper
presented at Psychological Treatments of Schizophrenia, Oxford, 23–24 September.
Robson, C. (1993). Real World Research: a resource for social scientists and practitioner-researchers.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Smari, J., Stefansson, S. and Thorgilsson, H. (1994). Paranoia, self consciousness and social cognition
in schizophrenics. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 18, 387–399.
Startup, M., Freeman, D. and Garety, P. A. (2007). Persecutory delusions and catastrophic worry in
psychosis: developing an understanding of delusional distress and persistence. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 45, 523–537.
Tabachnick, B. G. and Fidell, L. S. (1996). Using Multivariate Statistics. New York: HarperCollins.
Beliefs about paranoia 53
Tien, A. Y. and Anthony, J. C. (1990). Epidemiological analysis of alcohol and drug use as risk factors
for psychotic experiences. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 178, 473–480.
Wells, A. (1995). Metacognition and worry: a cognitive model of generalized anxiety disorder.
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23, 301–320.
Wells, A. and Davies, M. (1994). The Thought Control Questionnaire: a measure of individual
differences in the control of unwanted thoughts. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32, 871–878.
Wells, A. and Matthews, G. (1994). Attention and Emotion: a clinical perspective. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
White, R. G. and Gumley, A. I. (2009). Post-psychotic PTSD: associations with fear of recurrence and
intolerance of uncertainty. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 197, 841–849.
White, R. and Gumley, A. I. (in press). Associations between intolerance of uncertainty, distress and
beliefs about symptoms following psychosis. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and
Practice.
Zigmond, A. S. and Snaith, R. P. (1983). The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. Acta
Psychiatrica Scandinavia, 67, 361–370.
